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Introduction 
 The relationships between and among the institutions of the legislative 
and the executive branches as stipulated by constitution and political practice 
make up the element of political system called the system of government. 
Different ways in which state power operates stem from different sources of 
legitimacy and various powers and relationships between and among indi-
vidual political institutions. Thus, different types and subtypes of regimes 
may be identified on the basis of their dominant common properties. The re-
search of political and constitutional systems has brought forth a variety of 
interpretations, theories and concepts. Typologizations of regimes are pri-
marily based on the character of the relationship between the executive and 
the legislative branches; the focus for the executive branch is on state presi-
dents i.e. heads of state. That is why the analyses of the position of presi-
dents within political systems dominate the concepts of presidential and 
semi-presidential systems, while governments and parliaments are secon-
dary. The role of presidents is the main property of these two systems of 
government, while in parliamentary systems the analyses of the relationship 
between governments and parliaments show a weak or a relatively weak role 
of the head of state. Therefore, the character of the executive and especially 
the role of the head of state are the chief defining property of a certain re-
gime type. 
 The theories and concepts of semi-presidential systems are centered 
round three groups of questions: the source of legitimacy of the legislative 
and the executive branches, their constitutional powers, and their relation-
ships. Starting from the authors’ views of what represents the fundamental 
property of this system of government, they try to offer some explanations 
and answers to these three groups of questions (or to some of them at least), 
according to their importance. Only by analyzing all these groups of ques-
tions may we answer fully what the semi-presidential system really is and 
determine its proper place in the typology of regimes. By omitting one or 
two of these groups we might fail to put together a clear picture of this sys-
tem and classify certain countries as semi-presidential though constitution-
ally and factually they may be quite dissimilar. Also, the classifications may 
either encompass too few countries or leave out some though they share 
certain properties with the included countries. In other words, there are two 
reasons why the theories and concepts that such classifications are based on 
are not useful for the empirical analyses of semi-presidential systems: either 
they classify the “wrong” countries as semi-presidential regimes or leave out 
the countries that should be classified as semi-presidential. 
 Ukraine and Slovenia, according to their constitutions and their existing 
political practices, have different constitutional and political characteristics 
on which the nature of their system of government depends. But, they have 
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one common characteristic – popularly elected president – which is crucial 
for the concepts and theories of semi-presidentialism. In the minimalist con-
cepts1 of semipresidentialism, the popularly elected president is the main 
characteristic that demarcates semi-presidentialism from parliamentarism. In 
other concepts of semi-presidentialism it is only one of the few characteris-
tics necessary for that demarcation. By comparing the systems of govern-
ment in those two countries and the application of Robert Elgie’s minimalist 
and Matthew Shugart’s non-minimalist concepts I will test the usefulness of 
the minimalist concepts in a theoretical and practical way. 
 
Robert Elgie’s “minimalist” concept of semi-
presidentialism: the conceptual bias and the problem of 
classifying and typifying systems of government 
 The Irish political scientist Robert Elgie, the originator of the influential 
minimalist concept of the semi-presidential regime, has written or edited 
several studies on semi-presidential systems in Europe and elsewhere2. 
Unlike Maurice Duverger, Matthew S. Shugart, and other authors studying 
semi-presidential systems, Elgie mentions only two defining criteria of this 
regime type: “A semi-presidential regime may be defined as the situation 
where a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime 
minister and cabinet who is responsible to parliament” (1999b:13). This 
definition is identified by Elgie as “a purely constitutional definition of the 
concept” (Ibid.) enabling him to classify semi-presidential systems as a pure 
type of regimes (besides the presidential and the parliamentary ones). Omit-
ting Duverger’s second criterion of the “quite considerable presidential pow-
ers”3 from his concept of semi-presidentialism has resulted in a huge in-
 
1 Mirjana Kasapović (2007) distinguishes between two orientations in the understanding of 
semi-presidentialism as a discrete type of the system of government: the maximalist (defining 
this system with about ten constitutive properties) and the minimalist (defining it by only two 
properties: popularly elected presidents and the election and impeachment of prime ministers by 
assemblies). 
2 Elgie is the editor of the anthologies Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (1999) and (with 
Sophia Moestrup) Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: A comparative study (2007), the author 
of several papers published in them e.g.: Semi-Presidentialism and Comparative Institutional 
Engineering (1999), The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism (1999), What is semi-presidentialism 
and where is it found? (2007). Elgie also wrote several articles in the journals fully or partly de-
voted to the semi-presidential system e.g.: The classification of democratic regime types: Con-
ceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions (1998), Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Con-
sequences and Contesting Explanations (2004) and Variations on a theme (2005). 
3 Duverger’s definition of semi-presidentialism runs as follows: “A political regime is 
considered as semi-presidential if the constitution which established it combines three elements: 
(1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, (2) they possess quite consider-
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crease of the number of semi-presidential countries; according to Elgie there 
are as many as 55 of them. The reasons for not including the “quite consid-
erable presidential powers” in Elgie’s concept are twofold. First, different 
authors cannot agree on what the “quite considerable powers” are. Some 
authors do not classify certain countries as semi-presidential regimes be-
cause their presidents do not have such powers. Others exclude some coun-
tries from that classification as their presidents do not have powers consider-
able enough for their regimes to be considered as semi-presidential. On the 
other hand, some authors include too many countries as for them “the term 
‘quite considerable’ covers a vast range of possible powers” (Elgie, 2007: 5). 
Instead of elucidating the vague content of this second criterion (and due to 
considerable difficulties in determining its content), Elgie falls prey to a 
conceptual bias by rejecting it and consequently narrowing his concept to 
only the two mentioned criteria. This enables him to unequivocally deter-
mine the number of the countries that, according to his concept, are semi-
presidential, but the content of the concept of the structure of the dual ex-
ecutive (the fundamental property of semi-presidential systems) is depleted. 
The dual executive requires that both actors (president and prime minister) 
possess certain executive and governing powers that directly or indirectly 
derive from the constitution. If a president does not possess such powers, he 
or she cannot be a major political actor on a par with the prime minister; his 
or her role is reduced to the position of the head of state symbolizing their 
nation’s unity and the president has only ceremonial powers or a narrow 
range of executive and governing powers. The fact that the president has 
been popularly elected provides him or her with legitimacy which in certain 
power constellations of the legislative and the executive branch can turn the 
president into an influential exponent of state power, but this does not de-
pend only on the manner of election but also on the reputation (or charisma) 
of the person occupying the post of the head of state. A typical example is 
Czech Republic during Vaclav Havel’s presidency. Owing to the charismatic 
status he had earned during the communist reign, Vaclav Havel played a 
more significant role in the Czech political system than he would have on 
the basis of his constitutional powers and despite the fact that he had been 
elected by the parliament and not by the popular vote. Elgie’s second reason 
for giving up on Duverger’s criterion of the “quite considerable presidential 
powers” is the problem of the likelihood of the intra-executive conflict. If 
this criterion was adopted and only the countries with powerful presidents 
were taken into account, it might be concluded that semi-presidential sys-
tems incite such conflicts; if the countries with weak presidents were taken 
into account, then such a conclusion could not be drawn (Elgie, 2005: 100).  
 
able powers; (3) they have opposite them, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess 
executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show 
its opposition to them” (1980: 166). 
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 Elgie’s views of the defining criteria of semi-presidentialism remind us 
to a somewhat modified earlier model of the classification of regimes from 
his paper The classification of democratic regime types: Conceptual ambi-
guity and contestable assumptions (1998). In it he makes a clear distinction 
between the dispositional properties and the relational properties in the 
classification of regime types. The dispositional properties are those that say 
“nothing per se about the powers of institutions and office holders…They re-
fer simply to the characteristics of the institutional framework within which 
any given set of power relations occurs” (224). The relational properties “are 
descriptions of actual power situations. They are statements concerning the 
actual capacity of presidents and prime ministers to mobilise the political re-
sources at their disposal” (224). Most constitutional powers are relational 
properties, though constitutions contain the dispositional ones as well. Elgie 
does not believe that the separation of the constitutional powers and the po-
litical practice in the conceptualization of regimes means that conceptual 
ambiguity is necessarily avoided: it will happen only if regimes are classi-
fied according to either the dispositional or the relational properties. If clas-
sification is made according to the dispositional properties, he thinks the 
following three aspects should be considered: 1. whether the positions of the 
head of state and the head of government are held by two persons or these 
two offices are united in one person; 2. whether they have been elected by 
the popular vote; 3. whether they are elected for a fixed term. By combining 
these aspects one gets 24 types of regimes. According to Elgie, five of these 
actually exist, and one of them is semi-presidential. In the semi-presidential 
system the institutions of the head of state and the head of government are 
vested in two separate persons; the first is elected by popular elections for a 
fixed term, the other is not. That regime thus has four properties: 1. popu-
larly elected president; 2. president’s fixed term; 3. prime minister is elected 
in the parliament; 4. prime minister’s non-fixed term. According to Elgie, 
when classifying regimes according to their relational properties, this can re-
sult in the contestable assumptions of various authors about the models of 
intra-executive relationships in individual countries. Although in the paper 
published in 1998 he came up with the above method of regime classifica-
tion, in his later works on semi-presidential regimes he chose not to follow 
his earlier guidelines. The extremely minimalist concept of the semi-presi-
dential regime was toned down by his new definition, which combines both 
properties: popularly elected, fixed-term president as the dispositional prop-
erty and the accountability of the prime minister and the cabinet to the par-
liament as the dispositional and the relational property. Although Elgie 
claims that that definition is based on the dispositional properties as well 
(Elgie, 2004: 317), the accountability of prime ministers and cabinets to par-
liaments means that parliaments may remove them. If, as Elgie argues, the 
presidential right to remove prime ministers and to dissolve parliaments is a 
relational property (as this right can be exercised only if the existing political 
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circumstances allow it), then the right of the parliament to remove prime 
ministers and cabinets can also be considered as such. In president-parlia-
mentary regimes, the parliament often cannot autocratically remove prime 
ministers or cabinets without reaching a consensus with the president or 
when the political circumstances do not allow it. 
 By analyzing the countries which, according to him, are semi-presiden-
tial, Elgie (2005) creates three types of semi-presidential systems based on 
the difference of the political practices in respective countries regarding the 
president’s position. These are: highly “presidentialized” semi-presidential 
systems, semi-presidential systems with ceremonial presidents, and semi-
presidential systems with the balance of presidential and prime-ministerial 
powers. The first category may be detrimental for democracy because the 
outcomes of presidential elections in semi-presidential regimes that are con-
ducted according in line with the principle “winner-takes-all” (drawing on 
Arend Lijphart) may result in the emergence of a highly personalized insti-
tution of president, whose holders may “ridicule” the democratic process and 
feud with the legislative body. In the second category semi-presidential sys-
tems function as parliamentary ones. The president has only ceremonial 
powers i.e. he or she is a “symbolic leader with few constitutional powers” 
(Elgie, 2005: 105), while the real power is wielded by the prime minister. 
Direct elections make presidents spokespersons for the nation, and the fact 
that they have insufficient powers though they enjoy legitimacy cannot be 
held against prime ministers nor can presidents emerge as their political ri-
vals. Elgie includes six countries in this category: Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland, 
Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia. Although the Slovenian Constitution envis-
ages very few powers for Slovenian presidents, this cannot be said of, for 
example, the Austrian presidents. Even if one takes into account Elgie’s 
chief objection that it is difficult to determine what constitutes considerable 
presidential powers, the Austrian Constitution envisages for the president 
bigger powers than the purely ceremonial ones. However, due to the political 
practice in that country Austria would be categorized as a state with ceremo-
nial presidents. In the third and the last category of semi-presidential systems 
both the president and the prime minister are given significant (Elgie uses 
the word significant; Duverger quite considerable) powers. This category 
includes for example France, Ukraine, Niger, Poland and Croatia. According 
to Elgie, in Poland and Croatia the prime minister is the “primary decision 
maker, while the president has the power to intervene either sporadically or 
in one or more specific policy areas, usually in foreign or defense policy” 
(Elgie, 2005: 107). Finally, Elgie distinguishes three sorts of contexts in 
which a country adopts semi-presidentialism. The first is “purely symbolic” 
e.g. in the process of national self-determination, when a popularly elected 
president serves to reinforce the regime’s democratic credentials rather than 
to install powerful presidency. The second type concerns the “reasons of 
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governability” e.g. when semi-presidentialism is introduced after the col-
lapse of a parliamentary regime to create a strong president who should then 
prevent a repeat of the former regime’s weaknesses. The third type emerges 
in democratic transitions, giving rise to either a strong or a weak presidency 
or to a power-sharing arrangement among president, prime minister and par-
liament. 
 
Matthew S. Shugart’s concept of semi-presidentialism: 
modification of Duverger’s concept and analysis of various 
relationships between legislative and executive bodies 
 In 2005, American political scientist Matthew S. Shugart published the 
article Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority 
Patterns in which he set out a neo-Madisonian approach to the understand-
ing of how semi-presidential systems function. He emphasized the relation-
ships between institutional actors regarding the source of their legitimacy i.e. 
the provenance and lasting power of their authority. These relationships are 
called transactional and hierarchical, and serve Shugart to explain the inter-
action among presidents, cabinets and parliaments in semi-presidential sys-
tems. “In a hierarchy, one institution is subordinated to another… Transac-
tional relationships, on the other hand, are among co-equals. Two institu-
tions or actors in a transactional relationship each have independent sources 
of authority, and must cooperate to accomplish some task, thereby implying 
a horizontal juxtaposition of co-equals” (Shugart, 2005: 328). They are sepa-
rate in presidential and parliamentary systems, but are joined in semi-presi-
dential regimes by transactional relationships between and among the 
branches of government and by the hierarchical relationships between the 
legislative and the executive branches. Shugart uses two more essential ele-
ments in his concept of semi-presidentialism. First, he espouses Duverger’s 
defining criteria of the semi-presidential system (in a somewhat modified 
form4 and also drawing on Jean Blondel) as defining as well for the dual ex-
ecutive in which elected presidents, regarding their position in the system of 
government, are somewhere between the presidents in presidential and the 
presidents in parliamentary systems: on the one hand they are not mere 
heads of state since they have a measure of political authority, but on the 
other they are not unequivocal chief executives since there are also prime 
ministers as heads of government who are not necessarily accountable to 
presidents. Also, Shugart does not agree with Duverger’s and Lijphart’s 
claim that a semi-presidential system represents a modification of the presi-
 
4 “…Semi-presidentialism may be defined by three features: A president who is popularly 
elected; The president has considerable constitutional authority; There exists also a prime min-
ister and a cabinet, subject to the confidence of the assembly majority” (2005: 324). 
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dential and the parliamentary stages of government. He insists on distin-
guishing the institutional and the behavioral approach to defining semi-pre-
sidentialism, and on their strict separation. The first approach focuses on the 
constitutional structures of the relationships between and among the legisla-
tive and the executive bodies and on their competences, which enables us to 
understand the impact of individual extra-constitutional factors within the 
given constitutional structures. The second approach starts “with the ob-
served behavior and may even assume away the constitutional structure. If it 
does not assume it away, then how can the same constitutional structure 
sometimes be ‘presidential’ and other times be ‘parliamentary’? It cannot; 
rather a semi-presidential system always mixes features of both” (327). Ac-
cording to Shugart, there are two essential properties of semi-presidential re-
gimes: the juxtaposition of the popularly elected president and the cabinet 
accountable to the parliament, and the possibility that the institution that in-
stalls a certain “agent” does not have to be the one that will remove him or 
her. Based on the latter, two sub-types of the semi-presidential system are 
distinguished. In the premier-presidential system, presidents appoint the 
prime minister and the cabinet, but they can be impeached only by the par-
liament. Presidents cannot control cabinets and the relationships between 
them are transactional, except under the following two conditions: that the 
president and the assembly majority belong to the same political option, and 
that the president is the de facto leader of his or her party. In that case the 
cabinet will be subordinate to the president. In the president-parliamentary 
system presidents appoint prime ministers and cabinets but can also impeach 
them (as can parliaments). In that case it is no longer presidents and cabinets 
that are in the transactional relationship but presidents and assemblies, as 
they have to cooperate in the formation of cabinets. The presidential power 
of dissolving assemblies may bring into question this transactional relation-
ship but – in line with Madison’s and Weber’s arguments – Shugart believes 
that such a (significant) presidential power is in accordance with the “logic” 
of the semi-presidential system as it enables presidents to control assemblies 
and political parties in them. 
 Shugart’s concept of semi-presidentialism accepts Duverger’s conten-
tious second criterion, but questions its content. Shugart tries to explain the 
relationships between the legislative and the executive branches and to iden-
tify the essential properties of semi-presidential regimes and – though “bor-
rowing” certain elements of presidential and parliamentary systems – to 
make it into a separate system. It differs from the other systems not only by 
the fixed-term and popularly elected president, and the existence of prime 
ministers and cabinets accountable to parliaments, but also by the specific 
relationships among presidents, governments and parliaments, which can 
have various forms in various constellations of power, depending on the 
constitutional norms determining and regulating the powers and relation-
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ships between and among the institutions of the legislative and the executive 
branches. Shugart shows that the fundamental property of a system of gov-
ernment should not be sought only in the sort of the source of the legitimacy 
of presidents and governments (or prime ministers), but also in the powers 
belonging to certain parts of the executive branch. These powers result in 
different power relationships between and among institutions of the legisla-
tive and the executive branches which affect political processes in a state and 
determine the type of the regime. Moreover, we may conclude that the exis-
tence of “quite considerable presidential powers” is a prerequisite for a hier-
archical or a transactional relationship between presidents and cabinets. In 
the first case cabinets are accountable to presidents (the opposite is not pos-
sible). Such a relationship means that presidents have the power of scrutiny 
over the activities of cabinets, and this power may be labeled as significant 
since it indirectly results in the possibility for presidents to create public 
policy and to govern. In the second case the juxtaposition of presidents and 
cabinets can exist solely between equal institutions. Since cabinets as the 
highest executive body (albeit collective) possess governing and executive 
powers, it is necessary for presidents to have such powers in order to estab-
lish a transactional relationship.  
 The distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems based on 
presidents’ source of legitimacy results in even more pronounced differences 
among countries that would be considered as semi-presidential according to 
Elgie’s concept than among some semi-presidential and parliamentary states 
according to Shugart’s concept. That is why Shugart (1993: 30) introduces a 
special subtype of parliamentarism coexisting with the “pure” parliamentary 
system, which he calls a parliamentary system with president. In this regime 
presidents are directly elected by citizens, but the regime is nevertheless 
considered parliamentary since presidents do not have certain considerable 
powers that would elevate them above the position of the head of state in a 
“pure” parliamentary system. If we compare Shugart’s typology with Elgie’s 
we can see that Shugart distinguishes three types of regimes in which presi-
dents are popularly elected and prime ministers and cabinets are accountable 
to the parliament: premier-presidential, president-parliamentary and parlia-
mentary with president. Elgie, however, reduces all three Shugart’s types to 
one and calls it semi-presidential. 
 
System of government in Ukraine: structurally generated 
conflicts among institutions of state authority 
 Upon gaining independence in 1991 Ukraine was confronted with the 
problems besetting the other post-Soviet republics: how to build an inde-
pendent state and its political institutions. The referendum on independence 
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was held on 1 December 1991, together with the first presidential elections. 
The winner was the communist leader and chairman of the Ukrainian par-
liament (the Verkhovna rada) Leonid Kravchuk. The Constitution of the 
Ukrainian SSR of 1978 did not envisage the institution of the president of 
the republic; it was introduced by the constitutional novella of 5 July 1991.  
 The introduction of the institution of the president of the state marked the 
beginning of building new institutions of state authority. The constitutional 
committee for drafting a new Constitution was formed in October of 1990, 
but a consensus of various political actors about a new political system could 
not be reached. The previous system of the soviets (as a special type of par-
liamentarism labeled “the Soviet parliamentarism”), was supposed to be re-
placed by a new system of government. Although the experts from the Con-
stitutional Committee advocated the abolition of this system and the intro-
duction of the separation of power and a strong president (supported in the 
Ukrainian parliament by the opposition Narodna rada), the so called “Group 
239”5 was opposed to this proposal. To reconcile the two sides (and advocat-
ing a system with the directly elected president), president Kravchuk pro-
posed a system that would combine the presidential powers with the system 
of soviets. The Constitutional novella of February 1992 made the president 
chief executive, while the Law on the president’s representatives brought on 
5 March of the same year conferred on the president the power to appoint of-
ficials of central government at the local level; this meant that the president 
would get the powers related to the vertical separation of power. The presi-
dent obtained three more major powers: he directed the work of the cabinet, 
had the power to restructure the executive branch, and the power to bring 
decisions with the force of law in the economic sphere (Wolczuk, 2001: 
113).  
 In autumn of 1992 Kravchuk appointed Leonid Kuchma as the new 
prime minister. Kuchma managed to strengthen the prime minister’s power, 
and the right to bring decrees with the force of law, formerly vested only 
with the president of the state, was transferred to the cabinet. The more Ku-
chma pushed to increase his powers at the president’s expense, the more en-
dangered Kravchuk felt and wanted to reinforce his position. The dual ex-
ecutive became a liability in the state going through a severe economic crisis 
and commencing the tortuous process of democratic transition. The clash of 
the two powerful poles of executive power was resolved by Kuchma’s resig-
nation in 1993, but this did not dampen his craving for power. In the early 
presidential elections of 1994 Kravchuk and Kuchma were two main con-
tenders for Ukrainian presidency. Two years before, when Kuchma became 
prime minister, he was a nonentity, but in the presidential elections of 1994 
 
5 That group represented the communist delegates in the Ukrainian parliament elected in the 
1990 parliamentary elections. 
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Kuchma defeated his chief rival in the run-off. Soon he started wrangling 
with the Parliament (the Verkhovna rada), and demanded additional powers. 
The deputies did not want to yield to his demands, so Kuchma threatened he 
would call a referendum on the constitutional amendments that would enable 
him to achieve this goal. The Parliament granted him some concessions and 
in July of 1995 the Constitutional Agreement was signed, regulating the re-
lationships between these two institutions and increasing the president’s 
powers. The new Ukraininian Constitution was promulgated in June of 
1996; it inaugurated a president-parliamentary system of government.  
 According to the Constitution the president of Ukraine6 is the head of 
state and acts on its behalf. He is a guarantor of state sovereignty and territo-
rial indivisibility, of the observance of the Constitution and of human and 
citizens’ rights and freedoms (Article 102). The president is elected for a 
five-year term (Article 103), while the head of government is the prime 
minister appointed by the president with the consent of more than one-half 
of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna rada (Article 114). Arti-
cle 106 of the Constitution enumerates presidential powers in thirty points, 
with a proviso that the Constitution grants the president other powers: the 
power to terminate the authority of the prime minister and adopt a decision 
on his or her resignation; to call an “all-Ukrainian” referendum regarding 
amendments to the Constitution and proclaim an “all-Ukrainian” referendum 
based on popular initiative7. The president also designates special elections 
for the Verkhovna rada within the terms established by the Constitution; he 
or she dissolves the Verkhovna rada if the plenary meeting fails to com-
mence within thirty days of one regular session. On the submission of the 
prime minister, the president appoints members of the cabinet of ministers, 
chief officers of other central bodies of executive power, the heads of local 
state administrations, and removes them from office. On the submission of 
the prime minister the president establishes, reorganizes and liquidates min-
istries and other central bodies of executive power, acting within the limits 
of funding envisaged for their maintenance. The president revokes acts of 
the cabinet and acts of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea. In foreign policy, the president represents the state in interna-
tional relations, administers the foreign political activities and conducts ne-
gotiations and signs international treaties. The president also has significant 
 
6 In republican regimes the head of state is called the president of the republic, but in the 
Ukrainian constitution he or she is called the president of Ukraine. 
7 The president is obliged to call for a referendum following the popular initiative after 
three conditions have been met: the referendum petition has been endorsed by the signatures of 
no fewer than three million citizens with the right to vote; the signatures have been collected in 
no fewer than two thirds Ukrainian provinces; in each of them no fewer than a hundred thou-
sand signatures have been collected. 
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powers concerning defense and national security. The president is Com-
mander-in-Chief of the armed forces, appoints and dismisses from office the 
high command of the armed forces, and administers the spheres of national 
security and defense, the president is head of the Council of National Secu-
rity and Defense of Ukraine. The president forwards the submission to the 
Verkhovna rada on the declaration of a state of war, and adopts a decision in 
accordance with the law on the general or partial mobilization. In the event 
of a threat of aggression or danger to the state independence of Ukraine, the 
president declares a state of emergency in entire Ukraine or in some of its 
areas. The president’s powers regarding the organization of courts include 
appointing one-third of the composition of the Constitutional Court and es-
tablishing courts by the procedure determined by law. With the consent of 
the parliament the president appoints the procurator general and also dis-
misses him or her from office. The president possesses significant legislative 
powers: the right to legislative initiative, he or she signs laws adopted by the 
Verkhovna rada and has the right to veto these laws. In that case, the law is 
returned to the parliament for repeat consideration; a two-third majority of 
votes is required to override the president’s veto on the original draft of the 
law. Apart from this, for the execution of the Constitution and the laws of 
Ukraine, the president issues decrees and directives; some of them are co-
signed by the prime minister and the minister responsible for these acts and 
their execution. 
 
Table 1: Transactional and hierarchical relationships among institutions of 
state authority in Ukraine according to the Constitution of 1996. 
Relations among institutions Transactional Hierarchical 
President – cabinet/government - + 
President – parliament + - 
Parliament – cabinet/government - + 
 
 Based on the constitutional powers of the president and those he has in 
practice, in Elgie’s classification Ukraine is a “presidentialized” semi-presi-
dential regime. Since the independence and the introduction of the institution 
of the president, the Ukrainian political practice gave rise to a material Con-
stitution that, combined with the system of clientelism, enabled the president 
to have the upper hand regarding the other institutions of state authority to 
such an extent that the principle of checks and balances was betrayed. In 
fact, that principle was implied only in the proviso that the president could, 
to a smaller or bigger degree, control the work of the government and force 
the parliament to agree to certain concessions in his or her favour; the legis-
lative branch did not came up with an efficient mechanism of control or at 
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least counterbalance to the executive power. The changes of the electoral 
system of 1998 and 2004 were supposed to reduce the number of the parties 
in the parliament and bolster the party system in general. D’Anieri (2007) 
believes that a weak parliament was the main culprit for Ukraine’s plight in 
its transition to democracy. The reason for this weakness of the parliament 
was its inability to forge stable majorities that might have stood up to the 
president regarding the composition of the government/cabinet. Stable ma-
jorities could not be achieved because many parties and independent candi-
dates entered the parliament after the elections, and because the organization 
of the legislative body compounded the negative effects of this fragmenta-
tion. The fragmentation itself was a consequence of the electoral law which 
enabled a big number of parties and independent candidates to get a seat in 
the Verkhovna rada, and also because the party system was weak and uncon-
solidated, and the citizens mistrusted the political parties (D’Anieri, 2007). 
Due to the unpopularity of the first freely elected Verkhovna rada of 1994, 
President Kuchma succeeded to broaden his already considerable constitu-
tional powers in two ways: first, he forced the parliament to adopt the legal 
acts – first the Constitutional Agreement of 1995 and then the new Constitu-
tion of 1996 – that made for a strong position of the president in Ukraine’s 
political system; secondly, he exploited the state’s cadre and economic re-
sources in achieving his political objectives. Authoritarian elements in gov-
erning and bitter squabbling among the bodies of the legislative and the ex-
ecutive branches arose during the Kuchma’s presidency. Electoral rigging in 
the presidential elections of 2004 was thwarted only by mass demonstra-
tions, but the opposition had to give their consent for the constitutional 
changes which reduced presidential powers and increased those of the par-
liament. Even after their introduction at the beginning of 2006 the president 
still retained significant powers which, though reduced, nevertheless enabled 
him to maintain the status of a major political actor. 
 
Table 2: Transactional and hierarchical relationships among institutions of 
state authority in Ukraine according to the 2004 version of the Constitution 
of 1996 
Relations among institutions Transactional Hierarchical 
President – cabinet/government +/-8 +/-9 
President – parliament + - 
Parliament – cabinet/government - + 
 
 
8 The “minus” beside the “plus” indicates that the cabinet is still formally accountable to the 
President though he or she can no more remove it. 
9 Ibid. 
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 The relationship between the president and the prime minister varied be-
tween 1991 and 2008. Apart from the changes of the constitutional provi-
sions and the constitutional documents that differently envisaged the powers 
of the president, the cabinet/government and the parliament and their trans-
actional and hierarchical relationships, the position of the president versus 
that of the prime minister and the parliament depended on actual power rela-
tionships among various political actors. During almost entire Kuchma’s 
reign, the president domineered the government and the parliament. The 
president-parliamentary system thus brought about a total domination of the 
president and, practically, a complete dependence of one part of the execu-
tive (the cabinet/government) on the other (the president). This made the 
constitutionally established structure of the dual executive unique. The 
president’s domination might have been undermined had the Verkhovna 
rada been able to challenge his strongmanship10. D’Anieri (2007) shows how 
the high fragmentation of Ukraine’s parliament enabled President Kuchma 
to blackmail the parliament and the cabinet/government and strong-arm the 
concessions that augmented his strength in relation to them. After 2004 and 
the “Orange Revolution”, the constitutional changes strengthened the par-
liament and fortified the party system. On the one hand, the presidential 
powers were reduced and on the other the new electoral legislation replaced 
the segmented electoral system with a proportional one11. This created the 
institutional prerequisite for curtailing the parliament’s fragmentation and fa-
cilitated the formation of a stable and coherent coalition capable of forming 
government and offseting the president’s dominance. This altered the trans-
actional and the hierarchical relations among the president, the cabi-
net/government and the parliament. The president no longer has the right to 
remove the prime minister nor to – on his or her submission – appoint all the 
ministers. The Constitutional novella of 2004 stipulates that the president 
submits to the parliament the candidates for the ministers of defense and for-
eign affairs, but has no say in appointing the other ministers. In 1996 the 
cabinet was “the highest body in the system of bodies of executive power”, 
but in 2004 it became “the highest authority within the system of executive 
authorities”, which bolstered its position in relation to the president. The 
president and the cabinet are no longer in a hierarchical relationship (apart 
from the cabinet being formally accountable to the president, but the presi-
dent cannot terminate their authority); the relationship now is transactional. 
 
10 According to Protsyk (2003: 1079), all ten cabinets in first decade of post-communism in 
Ukraine had technocratic nature that reflected “the underdeveloped character of the party sys-
tem”. 
11 Fifty percent of 450 deputies of the Verkhovna rada were elected in single-member 
constituencies by the segmented electoral system; the other half was elected from the electoral 
lists at the national level. Now, with the introduction of the proportional electoral system, all 
450 representatives are elected from the electoral lists at the national level. 
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The hierarchical relationship between the cabinet and the parliament is still 
there as is the transactional relationship between the president and the par-
liament. Even with the constitutional amendments the president has retained 
significant powers (though he or she can no longer remove the prime minis-
ter); the system of government has morphed from a president-parliamentary 
into a premier-presidential subtype of the semi-presidential system. 
 
System of government in Slovenia: ceremonial role of the 
president and constitutional domination of the parliament 
over the government 
 Of all six former Yugoslav republics, the process of liberalization in the 
second half of the 1980s made biggest strides in Slovenia. In the spring of 
1990, the republican communist elites organized the first free multiparty 
elections in Yugoslavia in which the communists were defeated and the 
DEMOS coalition came to power. Although this gave Slovenia a headstart in 
relation to the other members of the Yugoslav federation, the constitution-
making process in Slovenia dallied, and Slovenia got its first Constitution 
only at the end of December of 1991, almost three months after it gained 
independence. Laying the constitutional foundation for a new political 
system necessitated the new institutions of state authority: a bicameral 
parliament was introduced, consisting of the National Assembly (Državni 
zbor) and the National Council (Državni svet), while the collective head of 
state was replaced by the institution of the president of the Republic. 
 In the new system of government the president of the state was not 
explicitly defined either as the head of state or the chief executive, but only 
as somebody who represents the Republic of Slovenia and who is 
commander-in-chief of its defense forces (Article 102). The president is 
elected in direct, general elections for a term of five years and may be 
elected for a maximum of two consecutive terms. If the term of office of the 
president expires during a war or a state of emergency, the president’s term 
shall expire six months after the cessation of such war or state of emergency 
(Article. 103). The office of the president is incompatible with any other 
public office or occupation (Article 105). Article 107 of the Constitution 
briefly enumerates the president’s powers; almost all are ceremonial. The 
only significant power is the right to bring decrees with the force of law. 
These decrees are issued by the president on the proposal of the government 
in the event of war or a state of emergency, when the first house of the 
parliament, the National Assembly, cannot convene. The president is obliged 
to submit to the National Assembly the decrees with the force of law for 
confirmation immediately upon it next convening. After consultation with 
the leaders of deputy groups the president proposes to the National 
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Assembly a candidate for the prime minister. If such candidate does not 
receive the necessary majority of votes in the National Assembly, the 
president’s role is diminished as the right to propose candidates for the prime 
minister is now given also to a minimum of ten deputies (Article 111). The 
president has no right to appoint the ministers as they are appointed and 
impeached by the National Assembly on the proposal of the prime minister 
(Article 112).12 The president cannot dissolve the parliament (except in the 
event of a repeated failure to form a government), he or she does not have 
any legislative power (except in state of emergency) such as legislative 
initiative, legislative veto or decrees with the force of law, does not conduct 
foreign policy, the government is not politically accountable to him or her 
and they cannot hold any other public office. The last provision would 
include any party function, although Cerar (2005) believes that the 
Constitution does not forbid the president to be a party official. 
Nevertheless, both president Kuchan and president Drnovshek suspended 
their party membership after taking office, in line with the generally 
accepted opinion about the supra-party role of the president, championed 
also by Max Weber when drafting the Weimar Constitution of 1919 
(Shugart, 2005). 
 
Table 3: Transactional and hierarchical relationships among institutions of 
state authority in Slovenia according to the Constitution of 1991 with 
amendments adopted till 20 June 2006 
Relations among institutions Transactional13 Hierarchical14 
President – government - - 
President – parliament - - 




12 Based on the role of the president of the state in forming the government and the appoint-
ment of the prime minister and the ministers, Kaučič (2004: 30) distinguishes three possible 
systems. In the first the president appoints the prime minister and the ministers. In the second 
the president does not appoint the prime minister but only nominates candidates for that post, 
but appoints the ministers following the prime minister’s proposal. In the third the president 
only nominates the candidates for the prime minister, and the parliament appoints the prime 
minister and the ministers. Kaučič includes Slovenia in the latter category. 
13 There is a sort of a transactional relationship between the president and the government 
and the president and the parliament only in a few exceptional occasions. 
14 The president has a limited role in the appointments of prime ministers, and this relation-
ship cannot be called hierarchical. 
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 In the political system in which the president has only ceremonial powers 
and gets somewhat more significant ones only in the event of war or state of 
emergency, the real power is in the hands of the prime minister and the gov-
ernment. The Slovenian Constitution grants the president the powers held by 
presidents in parliamentary regimes except for the fact that – unlike the 
“pure” parliamentarism (Shugart, 1993) – the president is elected by general 
elections and not by the parliament or – to quote Sartori (1994) – in a man-
ner involving the parliament. The central institution of state authority in Slo-
venia is the parliament (Cerar, 2005) i.e. its first house or the National As-
sembly, since the prime minister’s powers are limited even regarding the 
composition of his or her own cabinet. According to Cerar (2005), there are 
two reasons for this. First, the Slovenian public is “used to” the central role 
of the parliament (assembly), a legacy from the former communist regime. 
Second, at the time when the new Constitution was drafted, the parliamen-
tary majority to which Kuchan did not belong did not want to bestow on the 
institution of the president significant powers as, due to his popularity, his 
victory in the next direct presidential election was expected. This manner of 
electing the president was written into the new Constitution as it was the 
wish of the Slovenian public to have the head of state directly elected by the 
citizens. The Constitution stipulates that the National Assembly appoints and 
removes the ministers, and the prime minister cannot dismiss a minister he 
or she does not want to have in the composition of his or her cabinet unless 
approved by the parliament. The president cannot in any way influence the 
composition of the government (except in the appointment of the prime 
minister, but even in this he or she has to consult with the leaders of the par-
liamentary groups) or its work, and these two institutions are almost com-
pletely separate. Under normal circumstances, the president and the govern-
ment are in neither a transactional nor a hierarchical relationship, except in 
event of war or state of emergency when a certain transactional relationship 
exists since the president issues decrees with the force of law based on the 
government’s proposal. The president’s relations with the parliament are 
also not hierarchical, while certain elements of the transactional relationship 
between these two institutions exist in normal as well as in extraordinary 
conditions. First, the National Assembly is empowered to demand from the 
president to go on record regarding a certain issue and the president is 
obliged to comply; on the other hand, the president has the right, on his or 
her own initiative, to make his or her stance on a certain issue known to the 
parliament although the parliament did not ask for it. Second, both the presi-
dent and the parliament appoint the prime minister. And third, in wars or in 
emergencies, the parliament decides on the confirmation of the decrees with 
the force of law issued by the president. 
 Between the first presidential elections in December 1992 and the last 
ones at the end of 2007, three presidents held the post of the head of state in 
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Slovenia: Milan Kuchan, Janez Drnovshek and Danilo Türk. Kuchan’s was a 
two-term presidency; on both occasions he won in the first round. Almost 
three years prior to the first presidential elections he had already been the 
president of Slovenia; he was elected to that position in 1990 according to 
the old system of electing the president of the Slovenian Presidency. 
Drnovshek, a former president of the Yugoslav Presidency and several times 
the Slovenian prime minister, held that office for only one term (2002-2007). 
Both presidents were popular and played a much more conspicuous role in 
Slovenian politics than they should have by the Constitution. There are two 
reasons for this: first, prior to their becoming the heads of state both had 
been career politicians and holders of important offices; and second, they 
were elected in direct general elections. This source of legitimacy enabled 
them to take part in certain political processes, particularly in the relations 
with other countries, but not in shaping policies or ruling together with the 
government. This means that between the president on the one hand and the 
government and the parliament on the other there were neither hierarchical 
nor transactional relationships. The elements of these two types of relation-
ships between and among these institutions do not suffice to label them as 
such; accordingly, the Slovenian system of government can be classified as 
parliamentary and not as semi-presidential. 
 
Conclusion 
 The regime types are the starting and reference point for the classifica-
tion of political systems in individual countries. Two countries are proto-
typical for two classic systems, the presidential and the parliamentary: for 
the presidential system it is the United States and for the parliamentary it is 
the United Kingdom. The prototypes of the semi-presidential system that 
emerged in constitutional documents and political practice of the 20th cen-
tury are the Constitutions of Finland and the Weimar Republic of 1919 and 
the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of 1958 (with the amendment of 
1962). The evolution of the theories and the concepts of semi-presidential 
regimes mostly concerns identifying their defining properties, their differen-
tia specifica in relation to the other two systems. The main structural feature, 
the differentia specifica of the semi-presidential system as opposed to the 
presidential and the parliamentary system, is the structure of the dual execu-
tive – the president and the prime minister – characterized by significant 
constitutional powers of the president of the state. Popular presidential elec-
tions, almost regularly cited as one of the fundamental properties of semi-
presidentialism, are a welcome source of legitimacy of an institution of state 
authority in democratic political systems and reinforce the president’s posi-
tion in relation to the cabinet/government and the parliament. In contempo-
rary political systems, however, in which constitutions and laws are the most 
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important sources of law, the constitutional powers of presidents primarily 
determine his or her role in the system of state authority, and only then the 
manner of his or her taking office i.e. the source of their legitimacy. The 
minimalist concepts of the semi-presidential system, which significantly nar-
row the content of the term “quite considerable presidential powers” or re-
ject it completely, cannot clearly demarcate that type of the system of gov-
ernment from the other types; consequently, in their application and due to 
the risk of an overlap of the parliamentary and the semi-presidential regime 
types, this results in a dubious classification of countries as semi-presiden-
tial. Unlike that, the concepts that use the criterion of “quite considerable 
presidential powers” besides the criterion of the source of legitimacy and the 
nature of the relationships between and among the institutions of the legisla-
tive and the executive branches (though they do not taxatively enumerate 
which powers presidents must have for a system of government to be semi-
presidential, as this might mean going to the other extreme, the maximalist 
concept) are nearer to the identification of structural properties and the ex-
planation of the nature of that system than the minimalist concepts.  
 The difference between these two approaches in creating the concept of 
semi-presidentialism can be seen in the works by Robert Elgie and Matthew 
S. Shugart. While Elgie included in his concept only the source of the le-
gitimacy of the institutions of executive power and partly the relationship 
among the institutions of the legislative and the executive power, Shugart in-
cluded all three groups of problems and thus created a basis for analyzing 
semi-presidentialism which enables a better understanding of its properties 
and the ways and the institutional requirements for its functioning. The na-
ture of this system of government and its uniquness is best seen through the 
existence of hierarchical or transactional relationships, since the precondi-
tion for their existence is a certain degree of the constitutionally regulated 
powers of the president, the cabinet/government, and the parliament. 
 Besides the differences between these two approaches at the theoretical 
level, there are some empirical differences as well. The states that according 
to Elgie’s concept are classified as semi-presidential do not differ only in the 
constitutional powers of their presidents, but also in the political practice that 
shows what a regime is really like. In Slovenia the president does not pos-
sess considerable constitutional powers, and cannot override the prime min-
ister. The president can, by the power of his or her democratic legitimacy, 
occasionally influence the creation of government policy, but in the event of 
a conflict with the prime minister or the government, the president cannot 
win. Therefore, by all normative and empirical properties, the regime is par-
liamentary. According to Elgie, the only feature that would classify that state 
as semi-presidential is the popular election of president, though there are 
neither transactional nor hierarchical relationships between this institution of 
authority/power and the parliament. Ukraine, in which the president pos-
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sesses considerable powers, shows how a conflict between the president and 
the parliament or the prime minister can seriously jolt the political system 
and precipitate a political crisis, resolvable solely by a compromise between 
the conflicting institutions or by creating a consolidated majority govern-
ment as a result of presidential and parliamentary elections. The consider-
able constitutional powers of Ukraine’s president constitute transactional and 
hierarchical relationships between the president and the cabinet/government 
and the parliament which, besides the popular presidential elections and the 
government responsible to the parliament, unequivocally classify this system 
of government as semi-presidential, more so than Slovenia. 
 
Table 4: Sources of legitimacy and constitutional powers of institutions of 
legislative and executive branches in Ukraine and Slovenia according to 
their Constitutions 
 UKRAINE 1996 UKRAINE 2004 SLOVENIA 1991 






Appointing prime minister 
 
President 








Dismissing prime minister President or first 
house of parliament 
First house of par-
liament 
First house of par-
liament 
President’s discretionary right 
to dissolve first house of par-
liament 
- - - 
President’s right of legislative 
initiative + + - 
President’s right to legislative 
veto  + + - 
President’s decrees with force 
of law    +
15 - Only in state of emergency  
President’s right to call referen-
dums +    +
16 - 
President commander-in-chief + + + 
President signs international 
agreements + + - 
President appoints Constitu-
tional Court judges 
Appoints and re-
moves one third of 
judges 
Appoints and re-




bly candidates for 
judges 
Government’s right to legisla-
tive initiative + + + 
 
15 The transitional provisions of the Constitution confer on the president for three years af-
ter the adoption of the Constitution the right to issue decrees on economic issues if they are not 
regulated by law and if approved by the government and co-signed by the prime minister. 
16 This right applies solely to the referendums concerning the alteration of the Constitution 
and the referendum called by a popular initiative (Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine). 
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Table 5: Transactional relationships among institutions of state authority in 
Ukraine and Slovenia according to their constitutions 
Transactional relations among 
institutions Ukraine 1996 Ukraine 2004 Slovenia 1991 
President – cabinet/government -    +/-17 - 
President – parliament + + - 
Parliament – cabinet/government - - - 
 
Table 6: Hierarchical relationships among institutions of state authority in 
Ukraine and Slovenia according to their constitutions 
Hierarchical relations among 
institutions Ukraine 1996 Ukraine 2004 Slovenia 1991 
President – cabinet/government +    +/-18 - 
President – parliament - - - 
Parliament – cabinet/government + + + 
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